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Abstract 
Based on the argument that Corporate Social Responsibility is not just a fashion but rather the 
future from another angle, this paper explores the link between corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility in insurance. Although insurance industries have been less 
exposed to criticisms than other sectors, like any other business, they are subject to increasing 
societal scrutiny. After a short reconsideration of the corporate governance paradigms and 
mechanisms, the paper analyses the relevance of corporate social responsibility and corporate 
governance for the insurance sector. It explores its positive and negative externalities and its 
role as institutional investor. The paper also provides policy recommendations for 
mainstreaming corporate social responsibility within the sector.  
Key words 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate Social Responsibility: yet more hype without a sustainable future, or the 
future from another angle? 
Time and time again, with the regularity of a clock, businessmen and management professors 
find themselves assailed by new business fashions, pretending to hold the absolute and 
definitive key to strategy and thus to the future of the company. Kenneth Clark pointed to the 
danger of this when he stated that “Confident articles on the future seem to me, intellectually, 
the most disreputable of all forms of public utterance” (quoted in Barrow [1998]). It would be 
understandable to certain readers of this article to reject the concept of Corporate Social 
Responsibility as being just another business fashion, a new religion or a new ideology, which 
in practice has nothing to offer; understandable, but wrong, at least in the opinion of this 
article’s authors [Van den Berghe. & Verbeke, 2001]. 
The present contribution represents a reconnoitring of the future of business conduct and 
governance. To avoid provoking the above criticism of Kenneth Clark, however, we would 
just say that, in such an exercise, posing the right questions (and particularly continuing to 
pose them) is more important than giving answers, which will necessarily change anyway 
over the years. Indeed, anyone attempting to promote his or her piece of the truth as the entire 
truth destroys its value. 
Becoming involved in Corporate Social Responsibility can be seen as a passionate expression 
of faith. While disclaiming a passionate involvement, we aim to analyse the contextual factors 
that could lead to Corporate Social Responsibility simply being a sensible strategic option in 
the chaotic world we live in, or at least in a number of industries closely connected with the 
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knowledge society. Before doing so, we have to point to the link between Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Governance in the insurance sector. 
Approach and hypothesis of this contribution 
Faced with the increasing pressure for Corporate Social Responsibility and a broader role of 
business in society, it is no longer sufficient for a 'responsible firm' to live by the law and 
focus on financial profit to create value for shareholders. This is also true for the financial and 
insurance sector. However, traditional corporate governance as well as traditional 
management tools and accounting principles do not allow corporate social responsibility to be 
managed efficiently and effectively. This is the central thesis we want to discuss in this 
article. 
The first section of the paper highlights the increasing focus on the role of business in society 
and its effects on corporate governance. The concept of CSR is closely allied to that of 
governance. Both CSR and corporate governance have to do with the direction of companies 
and with the translation of that into corporate strategy.  
The second section addresses the relevance of Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate 
Governance for the insurance sector. In this section, we investigate first the sectors’ positive 
and negative externalities, secondly its role as institutional investors and thirdly we suggest 
some policy recommendations in order to mainstream CSR and Corporate Governance within 
the insurance industries. The concluding section presents some reflections and ideas for 
further research. 
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2. Increased focus on the role of business in society and its effects 
on corporate governance 
2.1. Business conduct is under growing scrutiny and paradigms are 
changing 
Business conduct is under growing scrutiny. There is increasing focus on the role of ‘business 
in society’ which shows a manifestation of change: business firms should have a 'responsible' 
attitude and behaviour, wherever they operate. This goes to the heart of CSR, which presumes 
a conscious search for a balance, beyond short-term efficiency, in order to achieve long-term, 
sustainable success, based on a balanced respect for the interest of all parties involved in the 
company.  
Corporate scandals like Enron or WorldCom in the United States, Ahold in the Netherlands, 
Vivendi in France or Parmalat in Italy, also resulted in a growing criticism against business 
managers and directors. It reveals shortcomings of corporate governance. A more thorough 
analysis of these corporate failures, which goes beyond the search for the 'guilty', clearly 
shows numerous failures of 'business monitoring': market failures, internal monitors that 
failed, shareholder monitoring failed and also management failures (for more detail, see Van 
den Berghe and Baelden [2003]).  
Paradigms are changing. Companies are facing a new invisible hand [Huysse, 1999], that is 
non market forces exerted by NGOs, media, trade unions, and others. This is a powerful force 
that reigns the business world and definitely opened-up the black box of board and 
management trade-offs and decision-making. Stimulated and influenced by this new invisible 
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hand, market parties also start to consider CSR and good corporate governance as the 
prerequisite for sustainable growth and welfare within a globalising business environment.  
Faced with the combined forces of the new invisible hand and the alerted market parties, the 
business world can no longer ignore its increased societal accountability as well as its 
externalities [Van den Berghe and Carchon, 2003]. Externalities are the side-effects of 
corporate activities on society. They can be either positive (economies) or negative 
(diseconomies). In this respect traditional corporate governance and management paradigms 
need a thorough reconsideration. 
2.2. The need for a new corporate governance paradigm and mechanisms 
The recent wave of corporate scandals in the United States (Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, etc.) and 
in Europe (Parmalat, Ahold, Vivendi, Lernout & Hauspie, etc.) has brought lots of attention to 
corporate governance.  
Corporate governance has been defined by Sir Adrian Cadbury as the direction and control of 
the company. In philosophic terms, it has to do with transparency, with accountability (in the 
sense that our errors can be laid to our score) and with honesty. In methodological terms, it 
has to do with the necessity of achieving greater certainty in the correctness of decisions 
being taken and to achieving that via a number of measures (structures, processes, checks and 
balances, correct monitoring, etc.). Proper governance will thus probably lead to the situation 
where, in a board of directors, various strands of interest (family shareholders, institutional 
investors, management and the common good) may and ought to be brought forward in 
discussion, but where ultimately resolutions have to be taken (by all) in the interest of the 
company, an interest which all members of that board are required to serve. 
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The idea of governance rapidly leads to questions that go beyond methodology and 
efficiency: what the purpose of business is, what the interest of the company is that has to be 
served, where the balance has to be sought between return and, for example, social 
responsibility. In this sense, corporate governance is a methodology for sustainability and a 
guard against the blinkered vision that can send a company down the wrong path. 
Furthermore, corporate governance and CSR are two concepts that draw vigour from the same 
source: transparency, accountability and honesty. 
Given the increased expectations towards business in society and taking into consideration the 
increasing mistrust due to corporate failures, corporations need to move towards responsible 
corporate governance that can balance the legitimate interests of all stakeholders involved and 
emphasises ethics and sustainable growth. Mainstream corporate governance, dominated by 
the traditional neo-classical view of the firm focusing on shareholders and financial 
performance [Van den Berghe and Carchon., 2003], is being criticised. A number of 
underlying paradigms need to be redefined or questioned. First, there is a need to redefine the 
role of the firm from the perspective of business in society and thereby to integrate more 
modern theories of the firm and alternative theories such as the resource-based view, the 
knowledge-based view, the networkers and the communitarians view (for more detailed 
information see Van den Berghe and carchon [2003] and Van den Berghe et al. [2002]). 
Second, one of the big challenges for corporate governance theories is to shift from the 
traditional principal-agent theory to the management of complex principal-agent relationships 
to take the many stakeholders interests into consideration. There is a need to integrate 
complex sets of relationships and their potential conflicts of interest and develop governance 
mechanisms to manage them effectively and efficiently. Third, the pure shareholder thinking 
as primary goal of corporations needs to be revised towards sustainable value creation 
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[George, 2001; Atkinson et al. 1997]. And finally, the question is whether there is a 
convergence to the dominant firm logic. The concept of the 'dominant firm logic' refers to 
those governance structures that are used as the reference base for developing (national) laws, 
regulations and self-regulatory recommendations [Van den Berghe et al., 2002]. Today, the 
dominant firm logic is highly based on Anglo-American models--Berle & Means model--of 
the publicly listed company with a (very) dispersed shareholding [Berle and Means, 1932]. 
However we argue that the prevailing global dominant firm logic is only relevant for certain 
types of firms [Van den Berghe et al., 2002]. Optimal corporate governance can be developed 
along a double track: while the basic corporate governance principles are universal, their 
translation and implementation in practice needs to be differentiated according to the type of 
firm (and its relevant governance challenges and problems1).  
Van den Berghe et al. [2002] developed an enlarged reference framework for corporate 
governance integrating corporate social responsibility. Six aspects are emphasised in the 
framework: managing conflicts of interest to avoid that private benefits prevail over the 
corporate interest; redefining the role of the board in order to make the correct trade-offs; 
more effective monitoring through independent/objective directors; empowering the board to 
go beyond the pursuit of short term shareholder value; no effective monitoring without 
information; responsible governance is not only a duty of business firms.  
3. Relevance of Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate 
Governance for the insurance sector 
The financial and insurance sector is –as any other business sector- subject to tougher societal 
scrutiny although presenting a lower exposure to environmental risks. It has had its corporate 
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scandals, especially in the 80’ies and 90’ies including for example BCCI, Maxwell (pension 
fund) or Barings. These were certainly at the origin of a first wave of stricter corporate 
governance rules in the UK (like the Cadbury Code in the mid 90’ies). The more recent 
corporate collapses also had quite substantial indirect effects on the financial services sector. 
Some illustrative examples in this respect were the conflicts of interest of investment banks 
and financial analysts, or the loss of pension savings in the Enron case. Another recent 
example is the Marsh & McLennan Case, the world’s biggest insurance broker, on price 
fixing and collusion. Moreover, the insurance sector, which was heavily invested in stocks 
after the bull market of the nineties, was greatly hurt by the stock exchange debacle, that 
followed these corporate collapses.  
The insurance sector presents some specific characteristics which make it an interesting case 
for applying the analysis of CSR and corporate governance. In the following section we will 
explore the positive and negative externalities of the insurance industry, its role as 
institutional investor and we will suggest some policy recommendations in order to 
mainstream modern concepts of CSR and Corporate Governance within the insurance 
industries.  
3.1. Sectoral relevance given its potential for specific positive externalities 
Given the huge potential for positive externalities, embedded in the insurance and financial 
services sector, it is clear that these firms perform a far greater role in society than their pure 
micro-economic market role. From a CSR-perspective this supposes that governments and 
civil society should foster the development of these sectors in order to optimise societal value. 
It is still open for discussion whether these positive elements are sufficiently taken into 
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consideration or whether the potential for negative externalities has overwhelmed the public 
perception. 
3.1.1. Management of pure risks: how financial institutions and insurers can help to 
solve societal problems 
From a conceptual perspective, we have proven the positive externalities created by the 
insurance and financial services industry [Van den Berghe, 1981]. In fact, by applying the law 
of large numbers, insurance companies transform individual insecurity into transferable risk 
and by doing so, they create a higher level of assurance and stimulate economic risk taking. 
Moreover, insurance is built on a solidarity mechanism between fortunate and unfortunate 
insured customers. In order to make insurance ‘affordable’ to persons and organisations with 
higher risks, governments can even allow insurers to build-in elements of obligatory systems 
of solidarity.  
One of the ways CSR could translate into better performance at corporate as well as at 
societal level, is through a more efficient and more effective risk management. The potential 
for positive externalities can clearly be documented by referring to some recent examples.  
 Strict liability, especially for pollution, makes financial institutions and insurances directly 
or indirectly responsible for the projects they are insuring or financing. For example in 
1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) in the U.S. backed up the Environmental Protection Agency‘s (EPA) efforts to 
clean up contaminated sites. This Act – also known as Superfund – made owners of 
contaminated sites liable for the cleanups. Although the Act exempted lenders from 
ownership status, due to the complexity of the issues involved, some banks were forced to 
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enter into the court procedure and some recorded financial losses [Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2001]. 
 A second example is the Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste issued 
in 1989 by the European Commission. According to this document the liability for 
damage caused by waste could be assigned to both a producer of the waste and a person 
“who had actual control of the waste, if he is not able within a reasonable period to 
identify the producer” (extracted from Schmidheiny & Zorraquin [1996]). The bankers’ 
community found the wording “actual control” potentially dangerous, since the 
interpretation of the phrase could lead to lender’s liability in certain instances.  
 Another example is the Fleet Factors case in 1990. The Fleet Factors Corporation case 
was among the first in a series of legal proceedings in the U.S. that eviscerated the banks’ 
exemption from Superfund liability. The liability issue has been an important element that 
started to question the role of financial institutions within sustainable development. 
Although it is a rather negative approach, financial institutions were forced to consider 
environmental aspects in their business.  
The liability issue is certainly an imperative consideration to be taken up by financial 
institutions and insurers. They have an important role of assessing risks, estimating ways to 
manage these risks and calculate the return of possible risk management routes. The insurance 
industry can help to remediate environmental damage and provide a mechanism to internalise 
environmental and social externalities by putting a price on environmental and social risks.  
Because it is desirable to prevent damage rather than remediate it, insurers need to send clear 
market signals to accurately price risks and reward socially and environmentally well-
managed companies. Since reducing risk is in everybody’s advantage and interest, it would be 
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beneficial to the corporation as well as to society at large if CSR would result in risk 
reduction. This was shown in the European Multi-Stakeholder Forum by the case of 
Federchimica: after adopting their Responsible Care Programme the number of accidents 
dropped significantly. This has a direct effect on the cost of insurance cover and hence, can be 
considered as a positive financial driver for CSR. On the other hand, if the business world is 
unable to answer the societal needs, new liability legislation could be further forced upon 
them. To what extent this creates new captive markets for insurance cover will depend on the 
insurability of the risks involved. 
Since liability has been clearly strengthened through legislation as well as through civil 
society, this also raises new challenges for corporate risk managers. If they want to gain 
access to bank finance or insurance at reasonable cost, they will need to improve their overall 
social and environmental performance.  
Another relevant CSR-issue for the insurance industry is climate change. Recent apparent 
instability in the weather and a succession of natural catastrophes have made it more difficult 
for insurers to calculate risks. The insurance industry already took some initiatives such as the 
development of financial tools to help business off-load some of its environmental risks, and 
the drafting by insurers of a U.N. charter on sustainable development. Leading insurers such 
as Munich Re and Swiss Re are taking the idea of global warming very seriously.  
3.1.2. Management of business risks: how financial institutions and insurers can help 
to evaluate the governance and risk profile of the business firms 
From a corporate governance perspective, the recent corporate collapses resulted in tougher 
regulations. Especially the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (aiming at all multinational companies listed 
in the US) directly and indirectly increased the focus on risk management for all companies 
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world-wide. Directors, members of the audit committees as well as external auditors have to 
pay attention to the management of corporate risks, not just the financial or the insured ones. 
Directors are responsible for insuring that an effective system of risk management is installed. 
This results in the fact that the core business of insurers and financial service providers 
becomes all of a sudden one of the focal points of attention of boards and top management. 
A positive side-effect of the instrumental role insurance and financial services firms are 
playing, could well be that they get more responsibility in judging the governance and risk 
profile of business firms. Regulations like Sarbanes-Oxley and the Basle II put indeed quite 
some additional responsibilities on the shoulders of insurers and bankers. The increased 
obligations on risk management and on monitoring of corporate governance, installed by 
Sarbanes-Oxley, will necessitate that insurers take a closer look at these elements before 
accepting to take over some of the business risk.  
 Illustrative in this respect is the amuck run by AIG, who had insured the directors’ 
liability of the failing Ahold executives. AIG blamed Ahold for their incorrect corporate 
governance. Recently they finally reached an agreement that laid down some far tougher 
rules on the firm. Ahold put in place a series of measures that aim at reinforcing 
accountability, controls and corporate governance. They have replaced the decentralized 
system of internal control with a one-company system with central reporting lines. The 
Internal Audit department now not only reports to the Chief Executive Officer, but also to 
the Audit Committee of the Supervisory Board. The accounting and business control 
functions have become more centralized while the division of responsibilities at Corporate 
level is now better reflected through the establishment of separate Business Controlling 
and Accounting and Reporting departments. Ahold initiated a company-wide financial 
integrity program, and is now convening a shareholders’ meeting devoted solely to 
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corporate governance. It is also one of the first companies in the Netherlands to 
implement the recommendation of the Dutch Tabaksblat Committee on corporate 
governance. Shareholders have been given more rights and the cumulative preferred 
financing shares have been restructured. All these proposals aim at improving 
transparency and a far-reaching increase in the power of Ahold’s shareholders. Indeed, 
they are considered by third-party experts to be at the forefront of corporate governance 
initiatives in The Netherlands. 
3.1.3. Management of economic and system risks: the large-scale impact of financial 
intermediation 
By intermediating between surplus and deficit sectors, financial service providers create 
economic value while facilitating corporate and private financing as well as saving and 
investment. The less capital markets are developed, the more important this intermediation 
function becomes. In this respect these firms can play a very important role in less-developed 
countries to start-off economic development.  
In buying insurance or investment product s, trust in the service provider is of enormous 
importance.  In life insurance and pensions, customers should have the trust that the company 
they pay yearly premiums to, will still be around after 30 or 40 years and be able to pay them 
back all of their saving money. In trusting one’s money, savings or investments to financial 
service providers, a customer must have the necessary guarantees of solvency and liquidity at 
all times. Trust in the financial system is therefore of utmost importance for the stability of 
the economy; hence the serious interference of governments to regulate these activities. 
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3.2. Special attention for the potential of negative externalities 
Unfortunately for the insurance and financial service providers, their sectoral specificities not 
only hold the potential for positive externalities. On the contrary, also important negative 
externalities can occur. These have probably gained far more public attention (recently) than 
their positive side-effects. 
3.2.1. The danger of false expectations and miss-selling 
Sometimes, customers of insurance and financial service providers suffer from ill-advised 
products, overselling or even miss-selling. This has not only given rise to numerous customer 
complaints, but also to outright scandals. In some cases it is clear that hard selling techniques 
and unfair distribution practices are at the heart of the problem. In other cases it is more the 
complex nature of modern financial services that gives rise to the potential for miss-selling. 
The more developed capital markets become, the more financial products proliferate in all 
formats and shapes. These sophisticated products can pose complex challenges for advisors as 
well as for customers to choose the correct product that best fits the customers’ specific needs. 
Moreover, the pricing of these products can become rather intransparent. This certainly holds 
for a great deal of investment products. That the potential for miss-selling is considerable has 
recently been shown in many countries:  
 Great negative publicity was given to the pension and mortgage miss-selling in the UK.  
 Another example of negative externalities was experienced by Dexia, a Belgian-French 
financial conglomerate. They suffered a huge reputation loss as well as numerous court 
cases in relation to the stock-lease products, developed by the investment company they 
bought from the Dutch insurer Aegon.  
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 In the US, numerous financial services providers have been condemned by the SEC for 
incorrect cost and investment allocations in their mutual funds in the US. 
That the number of these complaints and court cases has drastically increased the last couple 
of years is probably not due, in the first place, to an enormous deterioration of the ethical 
stance of insurance and financial services firm. A far more important driver is to be found in 
the effects of the new invisible hand. The Internet lowered the barrier for product 
comparisons, while consumer groups and frustrated customers have made large-scale use of 
the media to echo their complaints publicly.  
3.2.2. The silent revolution in shifting the risk burden back to the customer 
Numerous examples of actual and future shifting of the risk burden, back to the customer, can 
be observed in the insurance world. This silent evolution could well become a boomerang if 
not well addressed and managed in a responsible way. 
The more open the competition becomes and the more individualism reigns, the less viable is 
it to build large-scale solidarity into insurance products. In such environment, risk pricing 
becomes more and more individualised. For the good risks, this is a great evolution, but for 
the higher end of the risk spectrum insurance cover becomes far more expensive if not 
outright unaffordable. This has been overwhelmingly clear in the tough competitive battle in 
markets like auto-insurance. In some countries, insurers have been blamed for reckless pricing 
on the back of the more problematic risk groups. This in itself is a proof of the externalities 
and their devastating potential effects on this type of business. 
From a CSR-perspective, a future time-bomb is ticking under the pension system. With the 
growing longevity, the funding of pensions is increasingly under attack. Governments, 
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business firms as well as insurers and pension funds try to switch gradually from a defined-
benefits to a defined-contribution system. The enormous impact of this shift is however not 
sufficiently explained and the potential risks involved, for the future generations of 
pensioners, is certainly not clear at all. In an era of increased accountability and scrutiny of 
the business world by civil society, it is in the interest of the service providers to invest more 
time and effort in improving the understanding of the great consequences of this shift. 
Another important step could be to offer sufficient transparency and choices, certainly for 
those that can not or do not want to carry this risk burden themselves.  
3.2.3. From dominant firm logic to fair value accounting: is there still a future for 
long-term risk spreading? 
The focus on the dominant firm logic has driven the accounting principles into the direction 
of fair value accounting. In a listed company with dispersed shareholders the market is finally 
the best monitor. However market monitoring supposes very detailed disclosure, in order to 
make external monitoring feasible. Moreover in a stock market where the engine is made up 
of sharetraders and daytraders disclosure of fair market value is of tremendous importance. 
Although these recipes mainly hold for that dominant firm logic, as in any other field of 
corporate governance, all other types of firms are greatly affected too. In the EU the IAS 
accounting regime will hold for all listed companies that have to publish consolidated annual 
accounts, including banks and insurance companies. 
Without going into the detailed effects of this new accounting regime, it is necessary from the 
perspective of externalities to point to the negative effects this fair value accounting could 
have for the core business of insurance. Given the inversion of the exploitation cycle, the need 
for risk spreading from a time as well as from a customer perspective, insurers need to build 
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substantial technical provisions. Such long-term stability buffers are essential for smoothly 
performing their core function. Indeed, insurance is embedded in uncertainties as to the 
timing, frequency and amounts of claims to be paid. This is in fundamental contrast with the 
short-term focus of fair value accounting. Although solutions can be found in the capital 
market to shift the burden away from insurers, it remains to be seen whether this shift is not 
endangering the mere existence of the insurance transfer function. 
3.3. Specific Corporate Social Responsibility- and Corporate Governance 
relevance, given the role as institutional investor 
Although to a different degree, all insurance companies, pension funds, investment funds, 
credit institutions, etc. perform a role as ‘institutional investor. In respect to corporate 
governance as well as to CSR, the institutional investors can perform an important role. 
3.3.1. The potential role in shareholder engagement 
Many countries are supervising the investment behaviour of institutional investors in as far as 
it influences their solvency. Some go one step further, by making them accountable for 
effectively voting in shareholders’ meetings. If accountable for voting behaviour, this mainly 
focuses on disciplinary mechanisms to improve shareholder return. However, institutional 
investors themselves are under increased scrutiny from society in two directions: they are 
increasingly questioned about their own corporate governance while pressure is also 
mounting to enlarge their accountability for checking also the CSR-policies of firms. Indeed, 
insurance companies and pension funds are stewards of their customers or members’ money, 
and as such, they have a (very) powerful position. Their own corporate governance and CSR 
is increasingly being questioned: 
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“…are these interventionist owners of shares, who may simply be stewards of pension fund 
investments, empowered to act in disregard of employee considerations? 
 …highly visible yet frequently anonymous, with notable exceptions, creators of mergers 
and acquisitions, financial engineers, asset strippers, institutions, whom I’ve already 
argued often, are but the stewards of pension fund investments masquerading as owners” 
[Denis Cassidy, 2001]. 
As the recent literature points out the interest of institutional investors in CSR is increasing 
[Hummels and Timmer, 2003; Coles and Green, 2002; Bayon, 2001; Gribben and Faruk, 
2004]. But also inter-governmental organisations such as the European Commission or the 
U.N. and governmental organisations are exerting pressures on financial institutions and 
insurance to engage in CSR through their powerful position as investors. 
According to Clark and Hebb [2003] institutional investors changed behaviour in the 1990s to 
began to aggregate shareholders’ interest and to use their concentrated power, and the 
resulting reductions in transaction costs, to actively engage with board of directors in order to 
lengthen investment horizons and raise firm-level standards of behaviour across a range of 
issues such as accountability, transparency and, social and environmental standards. 
Shareholders have rights to align directors’ interests with those of shareholders and hold them 
to account for the management and performance of the company [Forum for the Future, 
2002].  
Institutional investors adopt different engagement strategies which range from passive to 
active. The first strategy, negative screening, is based on exclusionary criteria through which 
investors make use of their exit voice [see Hirschman, 1970]. Basically investors may decide 
to divest from a company or a whole sector if this one does not meet their criteria. The other 
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strategies are positive screening, engagement, and proxy voting. Hummels, Willeboordse et al 
[2004] define engagement as “influencing corporate policy by virtue of the position as 
investor and the associated rights”. Shareholder activism is the strongest form of engagement 
where shareholders exercise their power through general protest voting at AGM or the 
support of Socially Responsible Investment/Corporate Governance related shareholder 
resolutions [Eurosif, 2003]. Engagement differs from voting, as voting is often required by 
Law and in that sense not necessarily an active stance. These strategies, especially the last 
two, are more active and involve the voice option [see Hirschman, 1970]. Rather than simply 
divesting from companies engaged in activities they consider to be contrary to their values, 
investors are choosing to actively invest and use their positions as shareholders to affect 
corporate behaviour. These strategies are not exclusive, and investors can apply combined 
strategies.  
For a long time, the most active institutional shareholders have been found in the US, 
especially driven by large public pension funds like CalPERS and TIAA-CREF. More 
recently, the British insurers and pension funds started to develop their shareholder activism 
much more in concert with each other. Especially sectoral organisations, like the Association 
of British Insurers (ABI) and their colleagues from the pension side, the National Association 
of Pension Funds (NAPF) played a prominent role in this respect. Now that they also joined 
forces with the Investment Management Association (IMA) and the Investment Trusts (ITs) 
to form the ‘Institutional Shareholders’ Committee’, they are really becoming a powerful 
monitor of business firms in the UK. 
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3.3.2. Socially Responsible Investments: a marginal market or an important 
Corporate Social Responsibility-driver? 
According to Insight Investment, institutional investors and fund managers have a 
responsibility towards stimulating CSR. They argue that Socially Responsible Investment in 
particular might considerably influence the ethical stance of a company. As Socially 
Responsible Investment receives growing attention, more companies are actively taking 
measures to make sure they are not excluded from Socially Responsible Investment indexes 
such as the FTSE4Good and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. Therefore, Socially 
Responsible Investment and investor relations’ officers (who are both explaining companies’ 
strategies to investors and echoing investors’ expectations within their companies) are 
considered as possible drivers of a CSR-approach for companies. However it can take some 
years before investor relation officers will be able to perform their potential role as CSR-
catalysts. 
Socially Responsible Investment is a growing phenomenon. Between 1984 and 2001 it grew 
from $40 billion to $2.34 trillion [SIF 2001] in the US, and in Europe from 11.1 billion Euro 
in 1999 to 14.4 billion Euro in 2001 [SIRI Group, 2002]. However one should not overlooked 
that Socially Responsible Investment has still an extremely limited market share. Defining 
Socially Responsible Investment funds from both a positive and negative screening 
perspective, the relevant Socially Responsible Investment fund market is less than 1 % of the 
total retail market across Europe and between 2-3 % of the institutional market (figures for 
2003).  
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3.3.3. Socially Responsible Investments: a need for evidence  
According to Harry Hummels2, institutional investors will not consider Socially Responsible 
Investment unless there is evidence that there is a positive link between social, environmental 
and ethical issues and long term shareholder value.  
Fiduciary duties are the most important duties of institutional investors. They are required to 
carry out investment decision in the sole interest of their beneficiaries. Since no law in Europe 
clearly and explicitly defines the relationship between fiduciary duty and social, 
environmental and ethical issues, institutional investors do not feel the necessity to integrate , 
environmental and ethical issues in their investment policy. There are different views on this 
issue from both academics and practitioners. Generally the traditional view considers Socially 
Responsible Investment/Corporate Governance as having a negative effect on the profitability 
and therefore may infringe upon their duties. Academic research, analysing the portfolio 
performance of Socially Responsible Investment funds, shows diverse results [see Louche, 
2004]. The dominant claim is that Socially Responsible Investment provides higher financial 
returns than regular funds [Luther,et al., 1992; Mallin et al., 1995; Snyder et al., 1993; SIF, 
1998; Bauer et al, 2002]. A number of studies show inconclusive results either because of a 
lack of significant statistical difference between the returns of ethically screened and 
unscreened universes [Diltz, 1995; Sauer, 1997] or because of sector and style biases 
[Louche, 2001; Pava and Krausz, 1996]. Very few studies conclude that ethical funds under-
perform [Mueller, 1991].  
As long as the positive impact of , environmental and ethical issues on portfolio performance 
is not shown, institutional investors will remain reticent to Socially Responsible Investment. 
A positive relationship is a prerequisite for Socially Responsible Investment to become a 
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logical development. However, institutional investors are recognising very slowly that social 
and environmental standards are appropriate concerns in order to ensure long-term returns and 
therefore fulfil rather than detract from their fiduciary duty.  
3.3.4. Linking Socially Responsible Investments and Corporate Governance 
Recently Corporate Governance is becoming an important issue among institutional investors. 
The Parmalat and Enron scandals proved to the world that stakeholders can suffer from abuse 
by company management, as well as from misguided self-interest of influential shareholders. 
Moreover research showed that good corporate governance is positively linked to financial 
returns. Initially the scientific research was directed mainly towards the relationship between 
one or more corporate governance characteristics and the share price, valuation and earnings 
or the company. Positive relationships were found [Bauer and Gunster, 2003; Millstein and 
MacAvoy, 1998 ]. Other more comprehensive studies, such as Gompers et al. [2003], also 
showed positive results. Therefore and contrary to Socially Responsible Investment, 
Corporate Governance does not face the question of fiduciary duties as described in the 
previous paragraph.  
Although the Dutch Foundation for Corporate Governance Research for Pension Funds 
(SCGOP) recognises only an indirect link between Socially Responsible Investment and 
Corporate Governance [SCGOP, 2004] there are at least two clear links between the two (as 
we argued in section 2.2). First of all, Socially Responsible Investment and CSR advocate and 
encourage stakeholder dialogue. Shareholders are one of the stakeholders of the company and 
corporate governance enables the dialogue between the company and its shareholders through 
the right to information, shareholder’s representation at company board level, right to submit 
resolution at AGMs, and the voting rights. And secondly good corporate governance, both in 
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its informational and shareholders’ rights aspects, enables Socially Responsible Investment. 
As argued Clark and Hebb [2003], institutional investors have a role to play in the monitoring 
of firm management behaviour as they “engage directly with the firm through corporate 
governance over longer time periods” and “began making linkages between the underlying 
fundamentals of the firm, its day-to-day decision-making process and long-term shareholder 
wealth”. He also expects a greater awareness of the impact of corporate governance on long-
term value after scandals such as Enron and WorldCom.  
Through their rights, institutional investors can enable Socially Responsible Investment and 
CSR. Indeed what we see developing lately is the broadening of shareholders concerns which 
increasingly include issues related to social and environmental concerns. They argue that a 
greater regard for long term impacts of firms and increased CSR reduce risks, adds share 
value and in the long term serves owners’ interests. Although Socially Responsible 
Investment and Corporate Governance have a different end, they can be seen as 
complementary. As Clark and Hebb [2003] said, there is an intersection of interest between 
the two.  
Moreover, good corporate governance is central to Engagement and Voting. Although 
institutional investors may not use the traditional techniques of Socially Responsible 
Investment, negative and positive screening, they may embrace corporate engagement and 
voting as a sound mechanisms to raise firm-level standards and long-term performance. 
Through engagement they will improve transparency and disclosure of companies.  
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3.4. Some suggestions for developing a policy to mainstream Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance in the financial and 
insurance sector 
3.4.1. Greater emphasis on the management of negative externalities 
Compliance with customer needs 
Given the complexities involved with financial planning and risk management, an average 
customer is certainly not able to come up with a clear view on what his or her actual needs are 
and/or his or her future interests will be. With a more critical customer base and a more 
demanding society the insurance and financial services sector can no longer allow itself to 
stick to a push-marketing and a cross-selling attitude. The service providers need to invest 
more time and effort into a better understanding of the specific needs of the customer. In the 
context of the new invisible hand, too much focus on short-term profit at the cost of long-term 
sustainability can easily lead to a kind of a boomerang-effect. Building a corporate culture 
that rewards integrity will probably be a far better instrument than any strict regulation. 
Educative efforts towards (potential) customers 
Customers as well as employees and distribution representatives need a far better 
understanding of the complex characteristics of modern insurance and financial services 
products. Risk identification, risk transfer and solidarity, investment options and cost 
elements all deserve far more attention. But the most difficult challenge will be to make the 
transfer from mere product information over financial education to good financial advice. 
Interesting in this respect is the recent initiative of the OECD, financed by Prudentia to bench 
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mark best practices in financial education (presented at the OECD Forum in Paris on 12 & 13 
May 2004). 
3.4.2. Making more optimal use of the potential for positive externalities 
The focus of CSR and corporate governance on risk management carries huge potential for 
the insurance and financial services sector. This opens-up new opportunities for the 
development of tailored business solutions. At the same time, trade federations and other 
sectoral organisations should more pro-actively build on the potential for improving the 
sector’s reputation.   
From a governance, as well as a CSR perspective, insurers, pension funds and other 
institutional investors will increasingly be placed before their responsibilities as ‘external’ 
monitors of good corporate behaviour. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance has 
explicitly given the institutional investors the duty to perform a tough monitoring of the firms 
they invest in. After the Dutch Tabaksblat code did the same, there is now a Dutch initiative 
to install a special corporate governance commission to develop specific recommendations for 
the accountability of institutional investors. Faced with the potential for conflicts of interest, 
some of these service providers will turn to specialist shareholder services for outsourcing this 
important duty. However with or without outsourcing, they will finally be held responsible for 
making full use of their potential for stimulating positive externalities also on this level.  
In a recent speech at the London seminar of the International Insurance Society, the British 
Financial Services Authority explicitly stated their reliance on corporate governance 
mechanisms of insurers as a corner stone for its regulatory approach. 
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4. Conclusion 
From a societal perspective, the duties and responsibilities placed on the enterprise have 
increased drastically the last couple of years. The more the business world becomes a 
prominent economic force, the more society expects firms to operate in a responsible way. In 
essence a responsible firm takes into consideration all direct and indirect external effects of its 
operation. By doing so, the business world “confirms” that the pure market theory as 
developed by neo-classicals and contractarians is incomplete in as far as they are ignoring 
these externalities. 
As this paper shows, corporate governance and corporate social responsibility are highly 
relevant for the financial and insurance sector. As any other sector of activity, financial 
institutions and insurers are subject to tougher societal scrutiny. Its specific core business, its 
environment and its important potential for positive and negative externalities makes it an 
interesting sector for applying the analysis of CSR and corporate governance.  
Financial institutions and especially insurers can play an important role as evaluator of risk 
management and estimating risk management returns as well as institutional investors. 
Transparency and CSR can become additional valued properties for the financial institutions 
and insurers. This is in line with the view of the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) who argues that the pursuit of sustainable development makes the 
organisations “[…]more resilient to shocks, nimble in a fast-changing world, […], and more 
at ease with regulators” [Holliday Jr. et al, 2002]. The increasing level of CSR with regards to 
investment strategy goes hand in hand with risk management and integration of CSR in 
organisation structure [Moskowitz, 1972]. The investment policy must evolve hand in hand 
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with risk management and must support the evolution of Socially Responsible Investment and 
environmental, social and ethical considerations.  
A full-fledged Socially Responsible Investment strategy as investment strategy is maybe a too 
far reaching approach. However we believe that an engagement strategy may be a valuable 
strategy to stimulate CSR as it would provide financial institutions and insurers a direct 
contact with companies, including communication with senior management and board 
members about performance, corporate governance and other matters affecting shareholders’ 
interests, including CSR. Insurance, as institutional investors, should use their voting rights. 
For this purpose, it would be useful to write a policy document on the exercising of proxy 
votes as well as communicate to the clients the voting activities in order to improve 
transparency.  
The paper raised a number of issues that need to be further researched. First of all, financial 
services firms and insurance companies have to develop a better understanding of their 
numerous positive and negative externalities. However, assessment is only the first step in a 
comprehensive management of these externalities. Given the increasing attention for risk 
management and its relevance to both corporate governance and CSR, special attention must 
be given to build on the societal role the financial sector can play in this respect. In order to 
play its role of evaluator, the financial and insurance sector need better tools to assess social 
and environmental risks. Moreover, corporate governance and socially responsible investment 
are two powerful means for corporate social responsibility. Notwithstanding some integrative 
initiatives they remain two separate concepts. Socially Responsible Investment rating 
organisations recently tend to consider corporate governance more seriously and start to 
integrate some of these elements in their screening assessment. On the other end, corporate 
governance ratings only slowly start to integrate CSR-related indicators into their evaluation 
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instruments. It would be of interest for both managers and academics to further investigate the 
link between Corporate Governance and Socially Responsible Investment. It is only when 
there will be scientific certainty of a positive relationship that institutional investor may adopt 
a Socially Responsible Investment strategy. 
 
 
Notes 
1 For a more detailed analysis of the synchronization between firm typology and relevant 
corporate governance challenges at the one hand and corporate governance rules and 
recommendations at the other hand, see Van den Berghe et.al. [2002]. 
2 Interview with Harry Hummels, 25 May 2003 
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